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1. Introduction 
According to Stiglitz (1974) and Modigliani and Miller (1958), in efficient and integrated 
markets, the financial management policy cannot decrease the costs of capital due to the 
interrelation between the different types of capital costs. Consequently, there is no gain from 
substituting debt for equity. However, evidence has been found against this claim, 
demonstrating that equity financing is related to the predictability of stock returns. For 
example, firms issue equity when the equity premium is low in order to time an inefficient 
market and reduce the cost of capital borrowing and/or to optimize capital structure 
together with expected returns (Baker et al., 2003). On the other hand, there is substantially 
less literature on debt financing. For example, according to Bosworth (1971), debt maturity is 
related to market conditions, such as the interest and inflation rates. Furthermore, Barclay 
and Smith (1995) find firms with higher information asymmetries to issue short-term debt. 
They determine a positive relationship between debt-maturity and dividend yield as well as 
a negative relationship between the maturity of debt and the term-spread (Barclay & Smith, 
1995). Although the above papers provide support for the association between debt and 
returns, none offers information on the cost of capital borrowing at different times of debt 
maturity due to lack of analysis of returns data.  
The relationship between debt maturity and cost of capital borrowing is examined by Baker 
et al. (2003). In their paper, they analyze the variation in the maturity of debt due to debt 
market conditions (inflation and interest rates) as well as the excess bond returns. Excess 
bond returns are an index of investment-grade corporate bonds over commercial papers 
(Baker et al., 2003). In their article, the authors utilize aggregate annual time-series data and 
find a close relation between debt maturity and predictable variation in the excess bond 
returns. According to their findings, firms issue long-term debt when bond returns are low 
and short-term debt when returns are high. They explain the above evidence as managers 
timing an inefficient capital market using public information to guide their debt maturity 
decisions. They are, however, unable to conclude whether firms actually reduce the overall 
cost of capital borrowing from timing the market as a result of difficulties in interpreting the 
predictions of the regression results (Baker et al., 2003). 
This paper extends the empirical analysis performed by Baker et al. (2003) to the pooled 
time- and cross-sectional data in order to examine the relationship between the excess bond 
returns and the corporate debt maturity structure. In addition, the analysis extends previous 
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studies such as that conducted by Barclay and Smith (1995) by incorporating the bond 
returns information in the corporate debt maturity structure research. As a result, the study 
accounts for the relationship between debt maturity and the cost of borrowing at different 
maturities.  
The goal of this paper is to examine the hypothesis of the effect of the macroeconomics 
variables, excess bond returns, as well as the corporate debt determinants on the debt 
maturity structure at the individual firm level data. The Principal – Agent Theory and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis provide the theoretical framework for the analysis. The 
Principal - Agent Theorem describes the relationship between the lenders (banks) and 
borrowers (firms) in the credit market as well as the process of loan issuance. As firms’ 
investment decisions are not directly observable by the banks, the terms of the loan (interest 
rate, loan size, and length) are usually based on the firms’ observable characteristics such as 
wealth and size. The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that it is impossible in an efficient 
market to profit from market timing in the long-run. Market timing is defined as the 
opportunity to obtain higher return on investment by simply observing and responding to 
the changes in macroeconomic variables (Baker et al., 2003).The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
widely recognized by economists has been questioned by financial analysts. Several 
empirical studies including studies by Baker et al. (2003), Bosworth (1971) and Malkiel 
(2004), however, have found support for profiting from market timing in the short-run.  
Based on these theorems, it is predicted that small and unregulated firms with more 
investment growth options have less long-term debt. When the bond market cannot 
distinguish between high - and low – quality firms, defined by the firm’s abnormal earnings, 
the high-quality firms will signal their wealth through issuance of less underpriced short-
term debt. Both investors and low - quality firms realize the high – quality firm’s behavior, 
forcing the high - quality firms to issue more short-term debt (Kale & Noe, 1990). Similarly, 
firms with large potential information asymmetries are likely to issue short-term debt due to 
their larger information costs associated with long-term debt (Flannery, 1986). On the other 
hand, when the high – quality firms are faced with low risk of debt refinancing, they are 
more likely to issue short-term debt while less creditworthy firms will issue longer-term 
debt. The very poor firms cannot issue long-term debt as they face a higher likelihood of 
reporting low profits and facing higher borrowing costs (Berlin, 2006).  
Additionally, according to Baker et al. (2003) debt maturity is also related to debt market 
conditions, such as interest and inflation rates as well as a term spread. It is expected that 
the macroeconomic variables are negatively related to the maturity of debt. Following Baker 
et al. (2003), it is predicted that firms issue long-term debt when bond returns are low. 
Finding support for the impact of macroeconomics variables including excess bond returns 
on debt maturity decisions implies that in the short-run period firms lower the cost of 
capital borrowing from timing the market. In the long-term, however, this hypothesis 
should not be supported by the model’s results as suggested by the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis.  
The research objective is achieved by investigating the relationship between the excess bond 
returns, macroeconomics variables, as well as the determinants of the firm’s debt and the 
corporate debt maturity structure. In order to perform the analysis, the pooled time- and 
cross-sectional (panel) data for year 1991- 2000 from COMPUSTAT as well as the Federal 
Reserve are utilized. The variables used in the econometric analysis are: the dependent 
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variable: share of long-term debt, and the explanatory variables: excess bond returns, 
market-to-book ratio, regulatory dummy variable, log of market value of firm, abnormal 
earnings, term spread, inflation, and short-term interest rates.  
There are several Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation methods employed to estimate 
the relationship between debt maturity and its determinants. First, the pooled OLS 
estimation is utilized; however, there is a problem of unobserved error term dependence, 
which results in biased and inconsistent findings (Wooldridge, 2002). In order to correct for 
this issue, a cross-sectional OLS regression method is utilized in combination with the time-
series mean of each variable for an individual firm. However, this method only accounts for 
the variation across firms without analyzing the time-variation (Barclay & Smith, 1995).  
In order to investigate the time-series dispersion, fixed and random effects regression 
models are employed. In the fixed effects regression, the cross-sectional variation is 
arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables. In the random effects regression model, 
it is assumed, on the other hand, that the cross-sectional variation is random, and it is a part 
of the unobserved variation included in the error term. The Hausman specification test is 
used to test for the sufficiency of random effects estimation. Finally, in order to correct for 
the existing heteroskedasticity and serial correlation across panels, the generalized least 
squares estimation is used to obtain efficient estimators (Wooldridge, 2002).  
The results obtained from the OLS estimation provide evidence in support of a negative 
relationship between the debt maturity and the excess bond returns. Furthermore, the 
market-to-book ratio, abnormal earnings, as well as term spread and inflation are negatively 
related to the share of long-term debt. However, no statistically significant relationships 
were found for regulatory dummy and short-term interest rate although the coefficients of 
these variables had the predicted signs.  
The results confirm the hypothesis of debt determinants and their impacts on the structure 
of corporate debt. The findings imply that firms with few investment growth opportunities, 
large in size, and of high quality have a large share of long-term debt in their financing 
structure. There is, however, an ambiguous result with regard to hypothesis of market 
timing lowering the cost of capital borrowing. On one side, managers time the debt market 
and incorporate the debt market conditions as well as the excess bonds returns in their debt 
financing decisions. On the other hand, the short-term interest rate does not have a 
statistically significant impact on a firm’s financing decision as suggested by the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. The research results add to the undeveloped literature of debt financing 
by extending the analysis of the impact of debt determinants on debt maturity and by 
analyzing returns data and providing evidence for relationship between debt maturity and 
cost of borrowing at different maturities.  
2. Literature review 
The notion of the corporate debt maturity structure is explained by the determinants of debt 
structure and market conditions. All of the hypotheses tested here are derived based on the 
Principal-Agent Theory and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The hypotheses employed in 
this article include: Signaling and Agency Costs Hypotheses (all based on the Principal-
Agent Theory), as well as Market Timing Theory (based on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis). The following empirical analysis review represents the empirical evidence 
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either for or against the implications resulting from employment of the proposed theoretical 
framework when analyzing the financial decisions of corporate companies.  
Several terms should be defined before in depth discussion of the empirical issues related to 
the cost of capital borrowing and corporate debt maturity structure. Table 1 defines finance 
terminology needed for the article understanding. 
 
Terminology Description 
Share of Long-Term 
Debt to Total Debt 
The percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a maturity of more 
than three years 
Excess Bond Returns An index of investment-grade corporate bonds over commercial 
paper 
Abnormal Earnings The difference between next year’s and this year’s earnings per 
share scaled down by this year’s share price 
Market-to-Book Ratio The estimated market value of assets divided by the book value 
assets 
Real Short-Term Rate The annualized Treasury bill return minus inflation 
Term Spread 
 
The difference between the Treasury bond yield and the 
annualized Treasury bill return 
Inflation The annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index 
Debt Market Timing Responsiveness to the changes in macroeconomic variables 
Table 1. Glossary of Finance Terminology  
According to Barclay and Smith (1995), debt determinants are part of the agency cost and 
signaling hypotheses derived from the Principal – Agent Theorem. As discussed earlier, 
lenders are not able to observe directly firms’ behavior. As a result, specific loan contract 
terms help banks to differentiate between different types of borrowers while observing 
firms’ observable characteristics such as size and wealth. Based on the findings of the 
Principal – Agent Theory, the Agency Cost Hypothesis states that risky debt financing may 
enlarge the suboptimal investment incentives when a firm’s investment opportunity set 
includes growth options. Managers undertake underinvestment1 decisions controlled by 
issuing a short-term debt maturing before the firm’s growth opportunity is exercised 
(Myers, 1977). Consequently, the agency cost hypothesis states that firms with larger growth 
options in their investment opportunity set issue more short-term debt. 
Studies by Antoniou et al. (2002), Jun and Jen (2003), and Chen et al. (1999) find firms with 
larger growth options issuing more short-term debt. Antoniou et al. (2002) argue that the 
cost of financial distress of high growth firms is relatively high and therefore mangers are 
reluctant to raise debt capital (Antoniou et al., 2002). Furthermore, according to Jun and Jen 
(2003), firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength are more likely to issue 
more short-term debt. On the other hand, Harvey et al. (2001) also find that closely 
monitored debt creates shareholder value, because it reduces the agency costs associated 
                                                                 
1 Underinvestment – unwillingness of shareholders to take a positive net present value project when 
the profits will accrue mainly to the creditors (Foo and Yo, 2005). 
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with overinvestment. The lower costs of debt financing are a result of a long-term 
relationship established between the firms and the creditors (Antoniou et al., 2002). 
According to Barclay and Smith (1995), firms with relatively large numbers of investment 
opportunities tend to be smaller and take on short-term debt to avoid the underinvestment 
decisions and paying higher issuance costs associated with long-term debt. Issuing short-
term debt avoids the above problem as the price at which the firm repurchases its debt is 
fixed. Issuing a short term debt allows the stockholders to capture most of the returns from 
the new investments (Myers, 1977). Additionally, banks have a comparative advantage in 
monitoring and maintaining a stronger bargaining position when loaning short-term. Banks’ 
monitoring is especially important for firms with large informational asymmetries as these 
firms use more bank loans with short-term maturity (James, 1987).  
In accordance with the above hypothesis, larger firms issue debt with maturities on average 
longer by about 6 years (FEMA, 2006). However, Dennis and Sharpe (2005) find that as the 
borrower size increases, negotiating power with the lender and information transparency 
increase. The lender is able to spread the fixed costs of loan production across a larger dollar 
value of the loan and as a result, issue debt to larger firms (Dennis & Sharpe, 2005).  
Finally, regulated firms issue longer debt maturity than unregulated firms. This follows 
from the fact that managers of regulated firms have less discretion over future investment. 
Lower level of managers’ judgment over future investments lowers the adverse impact of 
the long-term debt. Consequently, a longer maturity period is preferred by the regulated 
companies (Barclay & Smith, 1995). In summary, it is predicted that small and unregulated 
firms with more growth options have less long-term debt. 
In the Signaling Hypothesis, the pricing of long-term debt is more sensitive to changes in 
firm value compared to the short-term debt. For example, high-quality firms defined as 
firms with positive abnormal earnings2 tend to issue more short-term debt compared to low-
quality firms defined as firms with negative abnormal earnings due to lower refinancing 
and mispricing3 costs (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Richardson and Sloan (2003) as well as 
Antonenko et al. (2006) find empirical evidence for low-quality firms obtaining overpriced 
long-term debt (higher interest rate than usual put on long-term debt). Richardson and 
Sloan (2003) further find that long-term debt follows a decreasing stock return period. On 
the other hand, Ozkan (2002) and Antoniou et al. (2002) find no empirical support for the 
signaling hypothesis. The volatility of earnings is found not to have a significant impact on 
the capital structure among the studied firms. Although not confirmed by all empirical 
studies, it is expected that high-quality firms (firms with positive abnormal earnings) issue 
short-term debt. Consequently, there is a negative relationship between the corporate debt 
maturity and the quality level of the firm (Barclay & Smith, 1995).  
According to Baker et al. (2003) debt maturity is also related to macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation, interest rates, term spread, and excess bond returns, although the impact 
of macroeconomic variables on debt maturity has not been examined thoroughly in the 
literature. As predicted by other finance articles, the macroeconomics variables should be 
                                                                 
2 Abnormal Earnings - measured as the difference between next year’s and this year’s earnings per 
share scaled down by this year’s share price (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
3 Misspricing – investor’s overestimation of the persistence of accruals and underestimation of the 
persistence of cash flow (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
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negatively related to the maturity of debt. For example, firms issue long-term debt when the 
excess bond returns are low (Baker et al., 2003). Furthermore, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find 
debt maturity to be negatively related to the term spread. Baker et al. (2006) additionally 
uncover that the term spread is positively related to future excess bond returns, which 
further implies that short-term debt is preferred when short-term rates are lower compared 
to long-term. Marsh (1982) as well as Graham and Harvey (2001), who also studied the 
impact of macroeconomics variables on debt maturity, find the amount of debt to vary with 
interest rates. The long-term debt is issued when interest rates are particularly low (Graham 
& Harvey, 2001).  
The fact that debt maturity is responsive to the changes in macroeconomic variables is called 
the debt market-timing. Market timing implies the opportunity to obtain higher return on 
investment by simply observing and responding to the changes in macroeconomic variables. 
Baker et al. (2003), Baker et al. (2003), and Baker et al. (2006) find evidence for managers 
timing the debt market by utilizing publicly available information on market conditions as a 
guide to their debt maturity decisions. For example, a large fraction of chief financial officers 
admit to following general debt market conditions while deciding on debt issuance 
decisions (Baker et. al, 2006).  
The phenomenon of market timing is, however, viewed as a short-run model. As presented 
in the Efficient Market Hypothesis section, in the long-run, it is not possible to profit from 
market timing as all investments are traded at their fair market value (Fema, 1970). In 
accordance with the hypothesis, Berlin (2006) believes that managers cannot time the 
market, because they do not have any information on future interest rate movements and 
therefore are not able to forecast the interest rates accurately. As a result, if the managers do 
not have accurate forecasts, the short- and long-term borrowing should lead to exactly the 
same borrowing costs (Berlin, 2006).  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Empirical model description 
The debt-maturity decision is modeled based on the Principal – Agent Theory and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. The lender maximizes its expected returns from providing the 
investment loans to the borrowers subject to the borrowers’ expected utility based on the 
chosen loan offer. The borrowers maximize their own expected level of utility provided by 
the chosen risk-level of the investment, the end-of-period wealth level, as well as the 
associated loan requirements set by the lender: interest rates and loan collateral. 
Consequently, the theoretical model guiding this empirical analysis is as follows:  
  Lender: Max v = ∑ [pm(1 + rml) + (1 – pm)Cl] (1)  
 Borrower: Subject to ∑ EUl= U1(W + R - (1+ rml)) pm + U0(W – Cl))(1- pm)  (2) 
where v represent lender’s expected returns from providing a loan offer, pm is the of the 
borrower’s probability of project success based on the chosen investment technique (risky or 
safe), rml represents the loan interest rate variable based on the firms wealth and risk level, Cl 
is the loan collateral variable based on firms initial wealth, U represents the borrower’s 
utility level, W is the firm’s wealth level, R is the firm’s investment return on the project.  
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The optimal condition for deciding on the amount and maturity of debt depends on the 
probability of project success as well as the borrower’s expected utility obtained from the 
project success:  
 pm/(1 - pm) = [U0 ‘(1- pm)] /[U1 ‘pm] 4 (3) 
Based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the borrower decides on the optimal investment 
decisions based on the results of the profit and utility maximization. The firm profit 
maximization is defined as: 
 Max П = R – TC = ( I0) - (1+ rml) I0 (4) 
where R is the firm’s investment return on the project, I0 is the investment level, TC is the 
total cost of investing in the project, and rml represents the loan interest rate. The manager’s 
utility maximization problem is defined as: 
 Max U(Y0, Y1) = U0(W0 – I0) + U1((1+ rml)I0) /(1 + ρ) (5)  
where W0 is the initial wealth and ρ is the subjective rate of time preference. The first order 
condition derived by taking the first derivative of both the profit and utility maximization 
problems with respect to I0 results in the following condition: 
  I0) = U’0(1 + ρ) /U’1= rml (6) 
Thus, in the Efficient Market Equilibrium the market interest rate offered for the loan (rml) is 
equal to the marginal inter-temporal utility as well as it equals the marginal rate of return on 
investment.  
Based on the maximization problems description, the debt-maturity decision is defined as a 
series of simultaneous decisions made by the firm and the lender. Equations (1) and (2) present 
that probability of investment success as well as the prevailing interest rate impact on the 
investment decision of the firms. As it is difficult to directly predict the firm’s probability of 
project success, the lenders approximate the success probability by observing the firm specific 
characteristics and based on the information issue a loan contract geared towards the firms’ 
needs. The loan conditions include cost of capital borrowing and debt maturity period. On the 
other hand, the firms might actively take into account changes in macroeconomics variables 
such as the interest and inflation rates when making their financing decisions.  
As presented above, only a system of simultaneous equations can represent these joint 
decisions as banks offer a number of loans from which the borrowers choose their desired 
contract features based on the loans’ characteristics as well as their own ability to pay off the 
debt in the future (Dennis et al., 2000). Financial theory does not provide the appropriate 
restrictions allowing for such analysis although several studies have attempted to estimate 
this simultaneous equation framework (Dennis et al., 2000). As a result, the debt-maturity 
model is a reduced-form regression based on the simultaneous equations system (Baker et 
al., 2003; Barclay & Smith, 1995).  
                                                                 
4 The first order conditions with respect to interest rate and collateral are:  
dl/d rml = pm - λ[U1 ‘pm] = 0 
dl/d C = 1- pm + λ[U0 ‘(1- pm)] = 0 
pm/[U1 ‘pm] = 1- pm/[U0 ‘(1- pm)] 
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The corporate debt-maturity model utilized in this article follows the model described by 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Baker et al. (2003). As a result, the theoretical debt-maturity 
model is presented as follows: 
 LTDit = f (MBit, LMVit, AEit, EBRit, TSit, INFit, STRit,RDi) (7) 
where LTDit is the share of long-term debt to total debt, MBit denotes the market-to-book 
ratio, LMVit is the natural logarithm of market value of the firm, AEit is the abnormal 
earnings, EBRit is the excess bond returns, TSit is the term spread, INFit denotes the inflation, 
and STRit is the short-term interest rate. The subscript i denotes the ith firm (i = 1,…, 652), 
and the subscript t represents the tth year (t = 1991,…, 2000). RDi is the firm regulation 
dummy variable, which does not vary over time. 
3.2 Empirical data tests 
Following the model specifications used by Barclay and Smith (1995) as well as Baker et. al 
(2003), the debt-maturity model estimated in this analysis is as follows: 
LTDit = ǂi + ǃ1MBit + ǃ2RDi + ǃ3LMVit + ǃ4AFEit  
 + ǃ5EBRit +ǃ6TSit + ǃ7INFit + ǃ8STRit + D’λi + vit   (8) 
where D’ is a row vector of dummy variables created for each firm’s month when the fiscal 
year ends, excluding the month of December and λi is a column vector of associated weights. 
The variable was added to control for the possibility of seasonal time heterogeneity in the 
model. Furthermore, it is assumed that the disturbance term in equation (2) is specified as a 
one-way error component model: 
 uit = ǂi + vit  (9) 
where vit ~ NIID (0, v2); i = 1,..., 652; t = 1991,..., 2000; ǂi denotes a firm-specific effect, and vit 
is the idiosyncratic error term (Hsiao, 2002).  
In order to adequately specify the equation to be estimated, the debt-maturity model is 
tested for violation of assumptions such as: normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, 
and multicollinearity. The software utilized in this analysis is Stata 8. In order to test the 
normality assumption, the Bera and Jarque’s LM skewness-kurtosis test for normality is 
used. The test is, however, sensitive to outliers and rejection of the null hypothesis provides 
no information about the alternative distribution to be used (Wooldridge, 2002). The 
problem of heteroskedasticity is examined utilizing the Breusch-Pagan test with the null 
hypothesis being that the uit are serially uncorrelated. The null hypothesis is rejected for 
negative values of ǂ2 (Wooldridge, 2002). Finally, testing the idiosyncratic errors vit for serial 
correlation identifies autocorrelation. Testing autocorrelation in panel data uses the time-
series errors (vit..), which are found to be negatively correlated when the vit‘s are 
uncorrelated. The null hypothesis for this test is that the time-demeaned5 errors are serially 
correlated. If serial correlation is found, the asymptotic variance matrix estimator and test 
statistics can be adjusted (Wooldridge, 2002).  
                                                                 
5 Time-demeaned Data - panel data where, for each cross-sectional unit, the average over 
time is subtracted from the data in each time period (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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3.3 Model specifications 
3.3.1 Ordinary least square estimation 
There are several ways of estimating the debt maturity model. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression is usually employed as it utilizes the actual values of the dependent variable. In order 
to allow for panel data estimation, OLS is often employed with either fixed or random-effects 
models (Berger et al., 2004; Hackethal & Jansen, 2006). The fixed- and random-effects models 
are discussed in the upcoming sections. On the other hand, other articles employ Tobit 
regression to estimate the debt maturity. As often the debt variable ranges between values of 0 
and 1 (some firms might not have any long term debt), the data is truncated at the 0 point and 
exclude observations below this threshold from the analysis. Truncation might also occur when 
the observations are missing from the sample due to other sensitivity limits put on the variable 
of interest in the data set (Antoniou et al. 2002; Magri, 2006).  
Although the Tobit model might seem like an appropriate method to estimate debt maturity 
data, several studies including Margi (2006) have criticized the utilization of Tobit model for 
panel data estimation. When Tobit model is employed in combination with random-effects, 
it may suffer from inconsistent estimates. The estimate inconsistency results from the 
absence of correlation between regressors and unobserved individual effects being not 
satisfied. Although several fixed-effects methods have been proposed to resolve this 
problem, the estimation process still yields inconsistent results or introduces complicated 
estimation processes not easily handled by current statistical software (Magri, 2006). Due to 
the several estimation limitations of different model specifications, different panel data 
forms of the OLS regression are employed in this article (Antoniou et al. 2002; Magri, 2006).  
3.3.2 Panel OLS regression types 
According to Dennis et al. (2000), the employment of the reduced form of debt-maturity 
model estimated using OLS estimation yields unbiased results. There are several OLS 
estimation methods employed to estimate the relationship between debt maturity and its 
determinants. First, the pooled OLS estimation is utilized; however, there is a problem of 
unobserved error term dependence, which results in biased and inconsistent findings 
(Wooldridge, 2002). In order to correct for this issue, a cross-sectional OLS regression 
method is utilized in combination with the time-series mean of each variable for an 
individual firm. However, this method only accounts for the variation across firms without 
analyzing the time-variation (Barclay & Smith, 1995).  
In order to investigate the time-series dispersion, both fixed and random effects regression 
models are employed. In the fixed effects regression, the cross-sectional variation is 
arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables. In the random effects regression model, 
it is assumed, on the other hand, that the cross-sectional variation is random and it is a part 
of the unobserved variation included in the error term. The Hausman specification test is 
used to test for the sufficiency of random effects estimation. Finally, in order to correct for 
the existing heteroskedasticity and serial correlation across panels, the generalized least 
squares estimation is used to obtain efficient estimators (Wooldridge, 2002).  
3.3.2.1 Ordinary least square regression 
The basic technique for estimating the debt-maturity model is pooled OLS estimation. To 
perform this procedure, the model is rewritten as follows: 
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LTDit = ǃ0+ ǃ1MBit + ǃ2RDi + ǃ3LMVit + ǃ4AFEit 
 + ǃ5EBRit + ǃ6TSit + ǃ7INFit + ǃ8STRit+ D’λi + uit  (10) 
where uit = ǂi + vit; vit ~ NIID (0, v2); i = 1,..., 652; t = 1991,..., 2000. The underlying 
assumptions of this model are: 1) the explanatory variables (xit) in each time period are 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error in each time period: E(xit’vit) = 0, i = 1,..., 652, t = 
1991,…, 2000; and 2) the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved effect 
in each time period: E(xit’ǂi) = 0, i = 1,..., 652, t = 1991,…, 2000. The regression estimation 
provides consistent estimators as long as the underlying assumptions are satisfied (Barclay 
& Smith, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002).  
3.3.2.2 Cross-sectional regression with time-series mean 
Since the OLS assumption of serially uncorrelated composite errors is not satisfied in the 
pooled OLS specifications, the t-statistics are overstated. To account for the potential error-
dependence problem, a single cross-sectional regression with the time-series mean of each 
variable by firm is used to perform the regression analysis. Running the OLS cross-sectional 
equations eliminates the problem of serially correlated composite errors. The estimated 
model is re-specified as follows: 
LTDi = ǂi + ǃ1MBi + ǃ2RDi + ǃ3LMVi + ǃ4AFEi 
 + ǃ5EBRi + ǃ6TSi + ǃ7INFi + ǃ8STRi + D’λi + vi (11) 
where vi ~ NIID (0, v2); i = 1,..., 652; t = 1991,..., 2000 (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Wooldridge, 
2002). 
3.3.2.3 Fixed and random effects models 
Estimating the model by the cross-sectional regressions preserves the dispersion across 
firms; however, it does not exploit the time-series variation in the observations (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995). To correct for the serially correlated errors, a random or fixed effects regression 
model can be utilized. In a random effects model, the ǂi is included in the error term, and the 
model takes the following specification: 
LTDit = ǃ0 + ǃ1MBit + ǃ2RDi + ǃ3LMVit + ǃ4AFEit 
 + ǃ5EBRit + ǃ6TSit + ǃ7INFit + ǃ8STRit + D’λi + uit (12) 
where uit = ǂi + vit; ǂi ~NIID (0, ǂ2); vit ~ NIID (0, v2); i = 1,..., 652; t = 1991,..., 2000. In the 
random effects approach, ǂi is incorporated in the composite error term under the 
assumption that it is orthogonal to the explanatory variables, (xit), E(xit’ǂi) = 0, i = 1,..., 652, t 
= 1991,..., 2000. Furthermore, the method accounts for the implied serial correlation in the 
composite error, uit = ǂi + vit, identical to the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
In the fixed effects model, the model specification is as follows: 
LTDit = ǂi + ǃ1MBit + ǃ2RDi + ǃ3LMVit + ǃ4AFEit 
 + ǃ5EBRit + ǃ6TSit + ǃ7INFit + ǃ8STRit + D’λi + vit (13) 
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where vit ~ NIID (0, v2); i = 1,..., 652; t = 1991,..., 2000. In the fixed effects analysis, ǂi is 
arbitrarily correlated with xit, E(xit’ǂi) ≠ 0, i = 1,..., 652, t = 1991,..., 2000 (Wooldridge, 2002).  
In order to identify whether fixed or a random effects estimation technique is appropriate 
for the analysis, the Hausman test is performed to examine the appropriateness of the 
random effects estimator. A Hausman test compares two estimators. Under the null 
hypothesis, the fixed and random effects estimators are consistent, but one is more efficient; 
under the alternative hypothesis, the more efficient of the two becomes inconsistent but the 
less efficient remains consistent. Thus, if the null is not rejected, the two estimators should 
be similar; divergence indicates rejection of the null. Rejection of the null further implies the 
effects are correlated with the individual variances, and the fixed effects should be used for 
estimation. The Hausman test statistic is as follows: 
 W = (ǃ^F − ǃ^R)’Σ -1( ǃ^F − ǃ^R), W ~ Χ2 (k) (14) 
where k is the number of estimated coefficients and Σ-1 is the difference of the estimated 
covariance matrices from the two estimators. Based on the test results, one of the methods is 
chosen to perform the econometric analysis (Wooldridge, 2002). 
As noted earlier, the problem of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation is a common issue 
associated with panel data; GLS estimation can correct for violations of the underlying 
assumptions. On the other hand, the random effects model accounts for the serial correlation 
in the composite error term and, therefore, corrects for the serial correlation of errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
3.3.3 GLS model corrected for panel heteroskedasticity and AR(1) 
Finally, the last problem associated with panel data is the problem of heteroskesdasticity 
and serial correlation across panels. The fixed and random effects models overlook these 
correlations and, therefore, yield inefficient estimators. The heteroskedasticity test compares 
the maximum likelihood of the model with panel-level heteroskedasticity to the model with 
homoskedasticity across panels. The autocorrelation across panels is tested based on the 
assumption that the idiosyncratic errors, vit, are serially uncorrelated in the random and 
fixed effects model specifications (Stata 8 Manual, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). By correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation across panels, the estimation procedure yields an 
error variance-covariance estimator, which is robust to the common problems associated 
with panel data (Stata 8 Manual, 2005). 
4. Data 
In order to investigate the relationship between debt maturity and its determinants, a large 
sample is constructed, following Barclay and Smith’s (1995) and Baker and colleague’s 
(2003) sampling method. The time- and cross-sectional data set merges the COMPUSTAT 
industrial annual file of debt determinants and the Federal Reserve’s file of macroeconomic 
variables. The sample is restricted to firms with Standard Classification codes from 2000 to 
5999 to focus on the industrial corporate sector. Furthermore, firms utilized in the study are 
present in the sample over the specified time period and have complete data for the 
explanatory variables. Consequently, the total number of firms included in the empirical 
analysis is 652. The data span is 1991 through 2000.  
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The construction method of the sample might cause a survivorship bias, which represents a 
tendency for some companies to be excluded from performance studies due to the fact that 
they no longer exist (Investorwords.com, 2005). In the present investigation, only firms with 
complete data for 1991-2000 are included in the analysis. The bias affects the results towards 
finding the predicted relationship between the debt maturity and debt determinants, 
because most of the surviving firms are larger and older with less investment opportunities 
and, therefore, issue more long-term debt. On the other hand, the bias prevents the analysis 
from finding the results predicted for the macroeconomic variables due to their high 
volatility over the time period of the study. 
The time- and cross-sectional data series are debt determinants: 1) total assets, common 
shares outstanding, debt due in one, two, three, four and five years, earnings per share, total 
equity, and stock price; and 2) macroeconomic variables: twenty-year government bond and 
commercial paper return, six-month treasury bill yield, inflation, and term spread.  
COMPUSTAT reports the amount of long-term debt payable in years one through five from 
the firm’s fiscal year end. Following Barclay and Smith (1995), the maturity structure of a 
firm’s debt is defined as the percentage of the firm’s total debt that has a maturity of more 
than three years. Several firms have less than zero percent or more than 100 percent of their 
total debt maturing in more than three years. Since these observations reflect data-coding 
errors, they are deleted. 
Excess bond returns are measured by an index of investment-grade corporate bonds over 
commercial paper. The corporate bond indices track portfolios that are continually 
redefined to a constant 20-year maturity. Excess government and corporate bond returns are 
the difference between the long-term corporate bond and commercial paper returns, 
respectively (Baker et al., 2003).  
There are four debt determinant variables used in this study: market-to-book ratio, a 
regulatory dummy variable, firm size, and abnormal earnings. Consistent with the Agency 
Cost Hypothesis, the market-to-book ratio is a proxy for the firm’s investment opportunity 
set. The market value of the firm’s assets is estimated as the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity (the price of shares multiplied by the 
total number of shares outstanding). The market-to-book ratio is the estimated market value 
of assets divided by the book value of assets (Barclay & Smith, 1995). In accordance with 
Baker et al. (2006), the variable is hypothesized to carry a negative sign.  
To estimate the effect of regulation on debt maturity, a dummy variable is constructed. It 
takes a value of one for regulated firms, and zero otherwise. Regulated industries include 
airlines, telecommunications, as well as gas and electric utilities. The firm size is the 
estimated natural logarithm of the market value of the firm (Barclay & Smith, 1995). As 
found in the studies by Chen et al. (1999) and Antonenko et al. (2006), the log of firm value 
is expected to be positively related to the share of long-term debt as a proportion of total 
debt.  
Signaling models assume that managers have better information about the firm’s value (or 
quality) than investors. To estimate the firm’s quality empirically, the firm’s abnormal 
earnings are defined as a proxy. The variable is measured as the difference between next 
year’s and this year’s earnings per share divided by this year’s share price. It is assumed that 
high-quality firms have positive abnormal earnings, and low-quality firms have negative 
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abnormal earnings (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Following Barclay and Smith (1995), 
observations with the absolute value of abnormal earnings greater than five were 
disregarded. The exclusion of the extreme values might affect the coefficient for the 
abnormal earnings, but should not influence the other variables in the analysis. 
Debt market conditions are represented by three variables: inflation, the real short-term rate, 
and the term spread. Inflation is the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index. 
The real short-term rate is estimated as the annualized Treasury bill return minus inflation. The 
term spread is the difference between the Treasury bond yield and the annualized Treasury bill 
return. In order to account for the cross-sectional variation of the debt determinants data, the 
market variables ending dates are matched with the firm’s fiscal year end (Baker et al., 2003). 
The descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. 
 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Value Max Value 
Share of Long-Term 
Debt to Total Debt 
Overall 0.587608 0.2489763 0 1 
Betweena  0.1307427 0.085569 0.938587 
Withinb  0.2119414 -0.23633 1.29564 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Overall 1.549547 0.9116479 0.360198 22.81232 
Betweena  0.707687 0.639052 7.222132 
Withinb  0.575302 -1.81968 21.19958 
Regulatory Dummy 
Variablec 
Overall 0.21319 0.4095923 0 1 
Betweena  0.4098753 0 1 
Withinb  0 0.21319 0.21319 
Log of Market Value 
Overall 2.698775 0.9371075 0.152839 5.435521 
Betweena  0.9146363 0.550687 5.332079 
Withinb  0.2067988 0.473086 4.102186 
Abnormal Earnings 
Overall 0.030876 0.4310666 -5 5 
Betweena  0.1028505 -0.35749 0.820588 
Withinb  0.4186344 -5.67963 4.901274 
Excess Bond Returns 
Overall 0.010944 0.022473 -0.052 0.079 
Betweena  0.004737 -0.00534 0.01641 
Withinb  0.021968 -0.03572 0.080104 
Term Spread 
Overall 0.012496 0.0120939 -0.0068 0.0351 
Betweena  0.0017139 0.01113 0.01565 
Withinb  0.011972 -0.00967 0.034366 
Inflation 
Overall 0.027276 0.0068753 0.0137 0.0565 
Betweena  0.0009295 0.02662 0.029 
Withinb  0.0068123 0.011976 0.055196 
Short-Term Rate 
Overall 0.021536 0.0127056 -0.0549 0.0501 
Betweena  0.0066697 -0.01892 0.02339 
Withinb  0.0108171 -0.01444 0.090556 
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Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Value Max Value 
January Dummy 
Overall 0.062883 0.2427718 0 1 
Betweena 0.2429396 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.062883 0.062883 
February Dummy 
Overall 0.019939 0.1398002 0 1 
Betweena 0.1398968 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.019939 0.019939 
March Dummy 
Overall 0.055215 0.2284164 0 1 
Betweena 0.2285743 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.055215 0.055215 
April Dummy 
Overall 0.015337 0.1229004 0 1 
Betweena 0.1229853 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.015337 0.015337 
May Dummy 
Overall 0.026074 0.1593665 0 1 
Betweena 0.1594766 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.026074 0.026074 
June Dummy 
Overall 0.07362 0.2611709 0 1 
Betweena 0.2613514 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.07362 0.07362 
July Dummy 
Overall 0.016871 0.1287986 0 1 
Betweena 0.1288876 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.016871 0.016871 
August Dummy 
Overall 0.019939 0.1398002 0 1 
Betweena 0.1398968 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.019939 0.019939 
September Dummy 
Overall 0.075153 0.2636589 0 1 
Betweena 0.2638411 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.075153 0.075153 
October Dummy 
Overall 0.049233 0.216371 0 1 
Betweena 0.216201 0 1 
Withinb 0.0117498 -0.05077 0.949233 
November Dummy 
Overall 0.016871 0.1287986 0 1 
Betweena 0.1288876 0 1 
Withinb 0 0.016871 0.016871 
a Between Group Estimates – variation between mean groups. 
b Within Group Estimates - deviations from a group mean. 
c Mean derived based on a dummy variable (i.e. Regulatory Dummy Variable) present the percent of the 
data falling into the ‘1’ category. 
Table 2. Data Descriptive Statistics Employed in Corporate Debt Estimation Process 
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5. Discussion of the results 
5.1 Comparison of alternative OLS models 
Results of tests of the debt-maturity model for violation of assumptions of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation are presented in Table 3. These results revealed 
significant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation issues. In order to account for 
misspecification problems, different model specifications were estimated including pooled 
and cross-sectional OLS, as well as GLS regressions. The precision and efficiency of the 
parameter coefficients were found to be sensitive to the chosen form. Finally, the Hausman 
specification test was utilized to examine the appropriateness of random effects estimation. 
As presented in Table 3, fixed effects estimation appears to be the appropriate model choice 
as the null hypothesis representing the difference in coefficients not being systematic is 
rejected (Χ2(8) = 22.24). For the purpose of proving the debt theory, however, both random 
and fixed effects are presented for comparison purposes. 
 
Test Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 
Probability > Test 
Statistic 
Ordinary Least Square Regression  
Bera and Jarque’s LM 
Skewness-Kurtosis Test for 
Normality No Skewness and Kurtosis Χ2(2) = 1.76 0.414 
Breusch-Pagan Test for 
Heteroskedasticity Constant Variance Χ2(1) = 91.47 0 
Test of Residuals Serial Correlation t = 20.45 0.006 
Fixed and Random Effects Regression 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier Test for Random 
Effects Constant Variance Χ2(1) = 844.55 0 
Hausman Specification Test
Difference in Coefficients 
Not Systematic Χ2(8) = 22.24 0.0045 
GLS Model Corrected for Panel Heteroskedasticity and AR(1) 
Likelihood-Ratio Test for 
Heteroskedasticity Across 
Panels 
No Panel 
Heteroskedasticity Χ2(651)= 2024.73 0 
Wooldridge Test For 
Autocorrelation Across 
Panels 
No First-Order 
Autocorrelation F(1, 651) = 78.425 0 
Table 3. Specification Test of the Corporate Debt Maturity Model Specifications 
Overall, the test-statistic and log likelihood values of each model specification indicate that 
each regression in Table 4 is significant at conventional levels. Comparing the models’ R-
square values suggests that variation in debt maturity structure across firms provides some 
of the explanatory power in these regressions. The R-square value for the different 
specifications ranges from 0.0101 to 0.1218, which implies that from 1 percent to 12 percent  
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Variables Pooled OLS
Cross-
Sectional OLS
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
GLS Model 
Corrected for 
Panel 
Heteroskedasticity 
and AR(1) 
Dependent 
Variable Share of Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 
Intercept 
(b1) 
0.43717*** 0.08306 0.27612*** 0.47550*** 0.59842*** 
(17.22) (0.08) (5.06) (15.93) (39.03) 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
(b2) 
-0.00951*** -0.13057* -0.00474 -0.00796** -0.00674** 
( -2.79) (1.80) (-0.99) (-1.99) (-2.16) 
Regulatory 
Dummy 
Variable 
(b3) 
0.01040 0.01082 
 
Dropped 0.00809 0.00656 
(1.29) (0.83)  (0.63) (0.99) 
Log of Market 
Value 
(b4) 
0.04724*** 0.04365*** 
 
0.11800*** 0.05250*** 0.01366*** 
(13.42) (7.40) (7.37) (9.71) (4.48) 
Abnormal 
Earnings 
(b5) 
-0.01543** -0.08694* 
 
-0.00955 -0.01269* -0.01212** 
(-2.19) (-1.79) (-1.44) (-1.94) (-2.18) 
Excess Bond 
Returns 
(b6) 
 
-0.23884* 
 
-0.12034*** 
 
-0.23886* -0.25854** -0.06003*** 
(-1.87) (-2.34) (-1.70) (-2.03) (-2.42) 
Term Spread 
(b7) 
-0.02786 0.02743 0.70750* 0.029691 -0.29725* 
(-0.08) (0.34) (1.89) (0.09) (-1.67) 
Inflation 
(b8) 
-0.34899 -0.46010 -0.26200 -0.34895 -0.57826** 
(-0.54) (-0.04) (-0.44) (-0.59) (-2.16) 
Short-Term 
Rate 
(b9) 
-0.27210 -0.19125 -0.09694 -0.25854 -0.11847 
(-0.72) (-0.98) (-0.28) (-0.75) (-0.85) 
January 
Dummy 
(b10) 
0.01737 -0.04619 Dropped 0.01713 0.03400*** 
(1.29) (-0.34)  (0.8) (2.54) 
February 
Dummy 
(b11) 
-0.00884 0.11801 
 
Dropped -0.00758 0.00954 
(-0.40) (0.22)  (-0.21) (0.04) 
March Dummy 
(b12) 
-0.0646*** 0.04413 Dropped -0.06550*** -0.05803*** 
(-4.55) (0.09)  (-2.96) (-5.91) 
April Dummy -0.00073 0.00564 Dropped 0.00377 -0.02318 
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Variables Pooled OLS
Cross-
Sectional OLS
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
GLS Model 
Corrected for 
Panel 
Heteroskedasticity 
and AR(1) 
Dependent 
Variable Share of Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 
(b13) (-0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (-1.06) 
May Dummy 
(b14) 
0.00897 -0.04860 Dropped 0.00953 0.44310* 
(0.37) (-0.36)  (0.28) (1.65) 
June Dummy 
(b15) 
0.00786 -0.09589 Dropped 0.01010 0.07890*** 
(0.64) (-0.38)  (0.52) (9.54) 
July Dummy 
(b16) 
0.00369 -0.12577 Dropped 0.00524 0.02657 
(0.15) (-0.38)  (0.36) (1.01) 
August 
Dummy 
(b17) 
0.00967 0.00738 Dropped 0.01286 -0.00612 
(0.44) (0.08)  (0.14) (-0.33) 
September 
Dummy 
(b18) 
-0.00963 -0.06278 
 
Dropped -0.00701 0.01354 
(-0.12) (-0.52)  (-0.37) (1.16) 
October 
Dummy 
(b19) 
-0.00170 -0.00627 0.07469 0.00102 0.00293 
(-0.81) (-0.14) (0.32) (0.04) (0.24) 
November 
Dummy 
(b20) 
0.06158*** -0.00320 
 
Dropped 0.06315* 0.11411*** 
(2.6) (-0.02)  (1.66) (16.49) 
Note: The coefficient estimates are represented as the first number for each independent variable. 
Numbers is parenthesis represents the standard error of each parameter coefficient. An * (**) (***) 
indicates significance at 10% level (5% level and 1% level). Pooled OLS regression: R-Square = 0.0388; F-
stat = F (19, 6500) = 13.79. Cross-sectional OLS regression: R-Square = 0.1218; F-stat = F(19, 632) = 5.17. 
Fixed effects regression: R-Square = 0.0122; Wald Χ2(19) = 137.54. Random effects regression: R-Square = 
0.0101; Wald Χ2(19) = 596.82. GLS Regression Corrected for Panel Heteroskedasticity and AR(1): Log 
Likelihood = 1601.881; Wald Χ2(19) = 596.82. 
Table 4. Estimation Results for the Corporate Debt Maturity Model 
of the variation in the debt maturity variable, is explained by the explanatory variables in 
the model specifications.  
5.2 Report of empirical results for different model specifications 
5.2.1 Ordinary least square regression 
Results presented in Table 4 suggest that debt maturity decisions are related to excess bond 
returns, debt determinants, and macroeconomic variables. The pooled OLS model 
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specification indicates that excess bond returns are negatively related to debt maturity (b6 = 
-0.23884) at the 10% significance level. Furthermore, market-to-book ratio and abnormal 
earnings are inversely associated with the debt maturity variable at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. Log market value is positively correlated to the dependent variable at a 1% 
level of significance. There is no regulatory effect found on the debt maturity decisions, 
although the coefficient on the dummy variable is positive, as predicted. Furthermore, none 
of the macroeconomic variables is statistically significant, yet all of them are negatively 
related to the dependent variable, which is in agreement with theoretical predictions. 
Finally, there is a statistically significant difference for the firms with fiscal year ending in 
March and November and the amount of long-term debt issued compared to the firms with 
fiscal year ending in December. For example, firms with fiscal year end in March tend to 
issue more short-term debt.  
5.2.2 Cross-sectional regression with time-series mean 
To account for the error-dependence problem in pooled OLS estimation, a single cross-
sectional regression with the time-series mean of each variable by firm was used to estimate 
the model. The excess bond returns are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 
and have a coefficient of b6 = -0.12034. The debt determinants: the market-to-book ratio and 
abnormal earnings negatively relate to the long-term debt decisions and have higher 
magnitudes compared to those obtained in the pooled OLS estimation (b1 = -0.01305 vs. b1 = 
-0.00613; b4 = -0.08694 vs. b4 = -0.01413). Log market value is positively associated with debt 
decisions and is higher compared to the pooled OLS estimate. Again, no market variables 
are statistically significant and term spread carries a positive sign. Finally, there is no 
statistical difference for long-term debt in capital structure for firms with fiscal year end in 
December and other months. 
5.2.3 Fixed and random effects models 
The cross-sectional regressions preserve dispersion across firms, but do not exploit time-
series variation in the observations (Barclay & Smith, 1995). The fixed effects regression 
model was estimated to correct for this problem. Both fixed and random effects results are 
reported and discussed. For the random and fixed effects regressions, there is a difference 
between the parameter coefficients and their efficiency levels. In the fixed effects 
estimation, the excess bond returns are negatively related to debt maturity (b6 = -0.23886). 
The coefficient is smaller in absolute value than the random effects coefficient by 0.02, yet 
it is less efficient (the t-statistic associated with the independent variable in fixed effects 
model is lower compared to the t-statistic in the random effects model specification). 
Furthermore, the log of firm market value is positively associated with the debt maturity 
(b3 = 0.11800), and it is the only debt determinant statistically significant in the model. The 
coefficient is larger than the random effect estimate coefficient (b3 = 0.05250) and has a 
larger standard error. Parameter estimates for market-to-book ratio and abnormal 
earnings diverge under the two models; in the random effects equation both variables are 
statistically significant and inversely correlated with the dependent variable, while in 
fixed effects equation both variables are statistically insignificant. In the fixed effects 
model, only term spread is statistically significant among the macroeconomic variables; 
the positive coefficient contradicts theoretical predictions. Finally, in the case of random 
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effects regression, there is a statistically significant difference between the firms with 
fiscal year ending in March and November in the level of long-term debt issued compared 
to the firms with fiscal year end in December. Due to multicolinearity observed in the case 
of fixed effects, most of the seasonal dummy variables were dropped from the estimation 
by Stata 8. 
5.2.4 GLS model corrected for panel heteroskedasticity and AR(1) 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation across panels are corrected by generalized least 
square estimation applying the correction for heteroskedasticity and first-order 
autocorrelation across panels with autocorrelation coefficient of ρ = 0.4070. The modification 
improved the precision and efficiency of the parameter coefficients in the regression 
compared to the previous specifications. The excess bond returns are statistically significant 
at the 1% level, and negatively correlated to debt maturity decision (b6 = -0.06003). The 
parameter coefficient is the lowest among all specifications. As before, market-to-book ratio 
and abnormal earnings are negatively related to the debt maturity decision. Log firm market 
value is positively related to debt maturity (b3 = 0.01366) at the 1% significance level. In the 
case of macroeconomic variables, term spread and inflation are negatively associated with 
debt maturity at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. These coefficients have the largest 
magnitudes among all the regression specifications. Finally, there is a statistically significant 
difference in the debt-maturity decisions for firms with fiscal year ending in January, March, 
May, June, and November compared to those with fiscal year-ending in December. For 
example, firms with fiscal year end in January, May, June, and November have a higher 
share of long-term debt compared to those in December.  
5.3 Results summary 
The fixed effects model as well as model corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation across panels are the specifications that should be given more weight when 
interpreting the regression results. The pooled OLS and cross-sectional model with time-
series mean display issues with the estimation of panel data. The pooled OLS model does 
not account for the error-dependence problem while a single cross-sectional regression with 
the time-series mean of each variable by firm does not employ the time-series variation 
within each panel. To correct for these estimation issues the fixed effects model is utilized. 
The model specification corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation across panels 
also should carry a higher weight in results comparisons as it improves the precision and 
efficiency of the parameter coefficients when compared to the other specifications.  
Based on the results presented in Table 4, there is a negative relationship between debt 
maturity and excess bond returns in all specifications. Furthermore, market-to-book ratio, 
abnormal earnings, as well as term spread and inflation are negatively related to the share of 
long-term debt. The firm size is positively related to debt maturity. Finally, there is a 
difference in long-term debt issues for firms with fiscal year ending in January, March, May, 
June, and November. However, no statistically significant relationships were found for the 
regulatory dummy and short-term interest rate, although the signs for these coefficients are 
consistent with theoretical predictions. Results here indicate the precision and efficiency of 
the model were sensitive to the model specification; corrections for violations of underlying 
assumptions are responsible for the magnitudes of these differences.  
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
The debt financing decisions are a set of simultaneous decisions made by lenders and 
borrowers. Since lenders are unable to observe directly the firms’ investment decisions, 
the banks offer contracts based upon the observable firm characteristics such as wealth 
and size. The contracts offered to each firm differ with respect to the cost of capital 
borrowing as well as its maturity. When deciding on the financing decisions, firms might 
also take into account the changes in macroeconomics variables in order to lower the cost 
of borrowing. As a result, the goal for this article was to examine the hypothesis of the 
effect of the debt determinant as well as the macroeconomics variables on the debt 
maturity structure at the individual firm level data. The research objective was achieved 
by investigating the relationship between these variables and the corporate debt maturity 
structure. A reduced form of the simultaneous debt decision model was estimated by 
employing several OLS estimation methods to analyze the relationship between debt 
maturity and its determinants.  
The examination of the excess bond returns as well as the debt and market determinants of 
corporate debt maturity supports the hypothesis that excess bond returns are negatively 
associated with debt maturity. For example, firms tend to issue long-term debt when excess 
bond returns are low. Furthermore, results here are consistent with Barclay and Smith’s 
(1995) and Antoniou et al. (2002) findings that firms with more growth options in their 
investment opportunity set issue more short-term debt. As a result, reducing debt maturity 
helps control the underinvestment problems as presented by Myers (1977). For example, 
underinvestment occurs when the debt maturity is not appropriately timed and debt 
refinancing occurs after investment options expire so the gains from new investments accrue 
to the debt holder (Johnson, 2003).  
As discussed by FEMA (2005), there is also evidence for a strong positive association 
between firm size and debt maturity in which large firms issue a significantly higher share 
of long-term debt. Finally, there is support for the hypothesis that firms use the maturity of 
debt to signal information to the market. In accordance with Barclay and Smith’s (1995) and 
Richardson and Sloan’s (2003) findings, high-quality firms issue short-term debt, while low-
quality firms issue long-term debt. There is no statistically significant evidence found 
supporting the impact of firms’ regulatory status on debt maturity, although the variable 
does carry the predicted sign, implying that regulated firms issue more long-term debt.  
The results obtained for the market variables are consistent with the hypothesis of 
macroeconomic variables impacting the debt maturity. The evidence is supported by the 
inverse relationship between the corporate debt maturity and the macroeconomic variables: 
inflation and term spread. Firms borrow long term when debt market conditions suggest 
that the relative cost of long-term debt is low. Although there is no evidence found in 
support of impact of short-term interest rates on debt maturity, the variable carries the 
predicted negative sign.  
The sign and the magnitude of impact of the term spread changes depending on the model 
specification. These differences can be explained by linking the variable to the impact of 
taxes on the debt maturity decisions. Due to a firm’s default on debt payments, the expected 
value of the firm’s tax liabilities depends on the debt maturity structure as long as it is not 
flat. For example, if the term structure is upward sloping, issuing long-term debt reduces the 
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firm’s expected tax liability and, therefore, increases the firm’s market value. As a result, 
there is a positive relationship between long-term debt and a slope of the term structure 
(Brick & Ravid, 1985).  
The limited impact of the term spread is explained by Lewis (1990) and Terra (2005) as taxes 
having no effect on the optimal debt maturity when the optimal debt-asset ratios and debt 
maturity structure are chosen simultaneously. Terra (2005), however, finds that taxes do 
have a negative relationship with debt maturity in the case of Latin American firms. As 
many researchers, he struggles to explain why taxes have no impact on debt maturity 
although the average effective tax rate for the U.S. companies is greater than those of other 
countries so the negative impact of the term spread should be statistically influential (Terra, 
2005).  
The finding of the negative relationship between the macroeconomic variables and debt 
maturity confirms the fact of the chief financial officers timing the market by issuing short-
term debt when short-term rates are low or when long-term rates are expected to decline. 
The finding is especially significant in the case of large firms, which have easy access to 
financial markets (Berlin, 2006). The findings confirm also the belief that managers watch 
the debt and therefore lower the borrowing cost. For example, Faulkendler (2005) finds that 
managers believing in market timing purchase a swap, amplifying the firm’s exposure to 
rising interest rates while undertaking new borrowings instead of hedging against the 
increase in interest rate risk. This implies that managers are likely to swap fixed interest rate 
payments for floating interest rates payments at the same time of the debt offering when the 
term premium is high (Faulkendler, 2005).  
On the other hand, not finding the short-term interest rate statistically significant is in 
agreement with the view shared by Berlin (2006) which states that chief financial officers 
cannot time the market due to limited information on interest rate movements (Berlin, 2006). 
As a result, managers might simply be wrong in their beliefs that market timing helps to 
decrease the cost of borrowing. Even if the cost of borrowing is lowered, it might not be a 
result of market-timing. Although Baker et al. (2003) find managers to exploit inefficiencies 
in debt markets and therefore, find lower borrowing cost, Butler et al. (2004) criticizes their 
econometric techniques and remains unconvinced of the market-timing phenomenon. His 
opinion as well as Berlin’s (2006) opinion is in agreement with the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, which states that it is impossible to "beat the market" because market efficiency 
causes existing investment prices to always incorporate and reflect all relevant information 
with regard to the market conditions (Fama, 1970). 
The analysis here has some potential limitations. First, results obtained in this study are 
affected by a survivorship bias due to the sample generating process, which only included 
firms with complete data for the entire 10 years of study. As a result, the firms that are 
included in the sample as a result are more likely to be larger and older with less 
investment opportunities. These firm characteristics bias the sample towards finding 
issuance of long-term debt. On the other hand, the bias works against finding the inverse 
relationship between debt maturity and excess bond returns as well as macroeconomic 
variables. High volatility of the explanatory variables over the time of the analysis makes 
it harder to obtain the predicted results due to lack of persisting trend in the variables. 
Consequently, based on the bias possibility, the results for firm characteristics have to be 
taken lightly. 
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Second, as discussed by Barclay and Smith (1995), the debt-maturity analysis could be better 
executed if more disaggregated data were used in the study. For example, firms with more 
growth options in their investment opportunity set issue more short-term debt; however, it 
is questionable whether the total variation might result in variation among instruments with 
different maturities such as short-term bank debt or long-term public debt. A more detailed 
examination of the mix of debt instruments issued by different companies would add to the 
depth and understanding of firms obtaining the observed debt structure (Barclay & Smith, 
1995).  
Further research on the debt maturity structure should not only include the mix of debt 
instruments, but also one, two, and three-year cumulative excess bond returns. By including 
the cumulative returns in the model, debt maturity sensitivity to the impact of long- and 
short-term returns could be estimated. Such analysis would provide further information on 
the cost of debt borrowing at different maturities. Additionally, the sample used in the 
analysis should include information for as many firms and years as are available, in order to 
increase the precision and efficiency of the results. Furthermore, a large number of firms 
included in the sample will decrease the possibility of a survivorship bias and offer a more 
representative sample of firms, so obtained results could be extrapolated and interpreted for 
all firms in general. In order to investigate in more detail the relevance of the Market Timing 
Hypothesis in capital borrowing process, the weekly/monthly data points instead of yearly 
values should be employed in the model. As mentioned earlier, the market-timing 
phenomenon is a short-run process, so with more frequent data points finding support for 
the hypothesis is more likely to be achieved.  
Finally, several changes should be made to the functional form of debt maturity and the 
empirical estimation framework. Since the functional form of the debt maturity function has 
not been defined by the finance literature at this point, the estimation process of the OLS 
models should include the specification tests for higher orders and interaction effects 
between the independent variables. Finding the right functional form of the debt maturity 
will improve the precision and efficiency of the model estimates and identify the debt 
maturity drivers. In addition, the empirical analysis framework should be extended to a 
mixing (averaging) estimator model to improve the efficiency of the estimation process. The 
idea behind the mixing estimator model is to average the estimators obtained from different 
OLS models to attain more efficient results compared to those derived from estimating each 
model individually while controlling for the omitted variable bias. The employment of the 
mixing estimator model results in fitted estimates that are asymptotically efficient with a 
minimum value of squared error in the class of discrete model average estimators (Hansen, 
2006).  
In conclusion, the analysis found evidence in support of impact of debt determinants and 
macroeconomic variables on the structure of debt maturity. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Backer et al. (2003), empirical studies of debt maturity need to incorporate the market 
conditions and the excess bond returns in order to adequately explain patterns in debt 
maturity data. 
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